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Introduction 
Although the US-Japan relationship is considered by both sides to be 
the most important bilateral relationship, the recent escalation in name 
calling and finger-pointing on both sides of the Pacific give evidence to 
the lack of mutual understanding that still persists. The misunderstan-
dings go far deeper than simply language, as some would believe. 
Last year, because of his supposed fluency in English, there were great 
hopes for improved communication and relations between the US and 
Japan after current Prime Minister Miyazawa gained his postl. It was 
assumed by many that the January discussions between President Bush 
and Prime Minister Miyazawa would progress more smoothly because 
of the improved communication. The resultant "agreement" and the 
widespread misunderstanding about whether or not Japan had promis-
ed to, or merely set a goal to purchase more American automobile 
parts shows that there is more than language difficulties at work 
here. It is the very different values, needs and narrow view that both 
countries bring to the bilateral trade arena that has created an almost 
insurmountable divergence in each country's perception of the other, 
and of the reasons for the current and persistent trade friction. 
The abundance of biased, incomplete, misinformed and outright incor-
rect reporting by the media in both countries has done nothing to 
alleviate the tensions and vitriol, and at times has served to intensify 
the frustration and underlying anger that is often present in US-Japan 
82 
negotiations2• Thirty seconds of Americans smashing a Toyota with a 
sledge hammer, or Japanese protesting import liberalization, leaves 
viewers with the impression that these views represent those of the ma-
jority. The continued use of the meaningless phrases 'Japan-bashing' 
and 'America bashing' reduce thoughts to child-like simplicity and only 
inhibit serious discussion of the issues involved. Politicians who use 
foreign trade and policy issues as smoke screens for a lack of genuine 
domestic agendas must also shoulder the blame for the continuing pro-
blems. 
It is unlikely that there will be a convergence of views any time 
soon, but it is important that the US and Japan fully understand that 
their opposite views are the result of perceived truths. In this brief 
paper I will attempt to show how each side sees the other, and present 
some of the evidence that is used to support each sides arguments. I 
will first present the Japanese viewpoint, followed by the US view. It 
will become evident that although the two parties are looking at the 
same problems and are often usirig the same data, the conclusions arriv-
ed at are totally dissimilar. The arguments presented in this paper are 
not assumed to be fair, accurate or consistent with the available 
evidence, nor what the author considers to be true. 
Japan's View: The End of Pax-Americana? 
Although Japan, through hard work and creativity, has accomplished 
great successes in the international industrial arena it has failed to 
dislodge its age-old feelings of vulnerability to, and isolation from 
foreign influence3. The Japanese culture and economy are very 
fragile. As a country, it lacks critical basic natural resources and is 
subject to severe and continuous natural disasters such as floods, 
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typhoons, earthquakes and volcanic activity. Although its ties with the 
ASEAN countries are continually strengthening, it is not yet part of 
any regional grouping of countries, as are its major competitors the US 
and EEC. It's small crowded islands are especially vulnerable to 
military threats, and it still struggles to preserve its uniquely different 
culture from undesirable foreign influences. 
Foreigners, especially Americans, simply do not appreciate the true 
level of Japans accomplishments. It is widely perceived that the ac-
tions of foreign countries greatly influence the economic destiny of 
Japan. This sense of vulnerability to other countries has made the 
Japanese excessively sensitive to actions by foreigners that may be 
seen as harmful to the interests of Japan. 
The continuing growth of Japan's trade surpluses has been the direct 
result of a well-organized government and society that has made a con-
scious decision to pursue economic prosperity and security for the coun-
try in place of personal gain. The dramatic yen appreciation, rising 
foreign protectionism, the elimination of most formal barriers to im-
ports, and constant demands by foreigners to change traditional 
business and cultural practices, make the economic successes of Japan 
all the more phenomenal. Because of its "economic miracle," Japan 
should be held in high esteem as a role model for developing countries 
and other industrialized countries whose economies are stagnating. 
Although the Japanese are proud of their achievements, they have 
refrained from becoming braggarts, but the continual accusations by 
the US and other trade partners that Japan's successes are based on 
anything other than fair trade are irritating to say the least. The 
average Japanese has come to believe that they are the victims of the 
frustrations of their international trading partners. The US's inability 
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to understand the unique social, political and industrial system of Japan 
is a direct result of the paucity of research they have done in these 
areas4• Japan's foreign trade system of importing raw materials, ad-
ding value to them and exporting them as high value-added products is 
a direct result of its abundance of dedicated managers and workers 
combined with its almost complete lack of natural resources. The 
US's superficial knowledge, growing jealousy, and inability to unders-
tand Japan has led to accusations that Japan's economic successes are 
part of a sinister plan whose ultimate goal is the domination of world 
markets and the economic colonization of the other industrialized 
countries5, and whose tools are an exploited workaholic work force, 
and collusive government-business relations that allow and even en-
courage cartels, price fixing, rigged bidding, industrial targeting, and in-
tentional exclusion of foreign goods; rather than simply the reward of 
hard work, sacrifice and higher intelligence. 
It is true that Japan was slow in reducing tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers to imports, but it now has one of the lowest import tariff rates of 
any industrialized country. If one walks through any large department 
store, it soon becomes evident from the multitude of imported goods 
that the Japanese market is as open as that of any other country. 
Americans refuse to understand that the Japanese market is so highly 
competitive, and the Japanese consumer so difficult to please, that 
even domestic companies must resort to cut-throat pricing and 
customer services unheard of in other countries just to survive. 
The US refusal the see its declining market share, slowing productivi-
ty level, growing trade deficit and uncompetitiveness as anything other 
than its own internal weaknesses that need immediate and urgent 
responses does nothing to win the hearts of the Japanese. It is ap-
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parently easier for Americans to complain about the "closed" Japanese 
market, and unfair or illegal trade practices of a sinister trading part-
ner, than to do the research and hard work that is required to succeed 
in Japan. The blame lies at the door of countries who's political and 
business leaders stood idly by as Japanese hard work, dedication, and 
superior skills took over and dominated one industry after another. It 
is the Americans that work too little, spend too little on educating a 
competitive work force6, refuse to learn superior manufacturing and 
management skills from Japan, and allow foreign competitors to in-
crease market share and influence in key domestic industries. The US 
has spent far too much energy complaining and whining about Japan's 
successes and not enough on putting its own house in order. The 
Japanese will have little sympathy for the US until it is perceived to be 
investing the same research, financial resources and long term engage-
ment strategies that are required of domestic companies for survival in 
Japan. 
Japan has done its share to help the ailing US economy. In 1991, 
Japan became the largest foreign investor in the US with $20.5 billion, 
or 31.8% of all foreign capital investment7• Trade statistics show that 
Japan's imports of manufactured goods from the US almost doubled 
from $17.5 billion in 1986 to $32.4 billion in 1990. In 1990, 27% of all 
imported manufactured goods came from the USB. This direct invest-
ment has resulted in over 400, 000 jobs in 1, 500 plants in the US 
nationwide9 • Japan's change from an export to a consumption driven 
economy, yen appreciation, and strong domestic growth are the basis 
for these dramatic increases in investment and imports. 
Japanese corporations have not only made capital investments in the 
US, but have also become involved in American community life by 
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making generous philanthropic donations to many nonprofit 
organizations1o. Yet, despite their corporation's contribution to, and in-
volvement in the US economy and community, Japanese corporations 
have not been as readily accepted as those of European investors in the 
USll. 
Hidden Racism 
Years of criticisms, accusations and trade negotiations that are often 
other than friendly have led the Japanese to wonder why they are 
seemingly being penalized for working so hard and being so succ-
essful. Why is it that few voices, if any, are raised in protest when 
European imports reach a high penetration level in the US, or Euro-
pean conglomerates take over US companies? Why are similar Euro-
pean trade disputes settled in a friendlier manner? 
For many Japanese the answer lies in the area of race. An increas-
ing number of Japanese are voicing the long hidden but deep seated 
feeling that unfair criticism of Japan is caused by the white Western na-
tions' feelings of superiority being threatened by the unequaled success 
of non-white Japan. The best known spokesman for this view outside 
Japan is probably Shintaro Ishihara. Ishihara, a former transport 
minister and right wing member of the Diet, and Akio Morita, presi-
dent of SONY corporation, wrote the best selling and controversial The 
Japan That Can Say N012. This book, which was originally written for 
Japanese domestic consumption only, was so controversial outside of 
Japan that Morita refused to have the chapters he contributed or his 
name included in the foreign authorized edition. According to 
Ishihara, the pride of white western countries stops them from learning 
from non-white societies, and their tenacious clinging to outmoded 
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political and economic systems keeps the former from admitting to the 
superiority of the new political-industrial societies of the East. 
During the last twenty years, US political and business leaders have 
continually underestimated the will of the Japanese people and 
overestimated their ?wn ability to correct the mistakes that have led to 
their current recession. The traditional American values of hard work 
and self sacrifice have been replaced by a culture of leisure and 
self-gratification. Criticisms of Japan as a nation of workaholics 
represents American resentment for practicing these lost values. 
Some Americans even complain that Japanese "cultural traditions" 
have contributed to Japan's trade surpluses, as though the Japanese 
characteristics of thrift, hard work, and development of long term 
business relationships are undesirable rather than desirable 
characteristics that should be emulated by less competitive cultures13• 
Until quite recently, Japan's security dependence on the US and the 
perception of US superior economic strength made Japan especially sen-
sitive to demands. But the demise of the Soviet Union and Americas 
current recession, combined with the continued growth of Japan's 
economy have put the two countries on equal footing if not given 
Japan the upper hand. Although external pressure has at times allow-
ed the Japanese government to make unpopular but desirable trade 
liberalization changes14, many of the US demands have begun to in-
trude too far into Japanese internal affairs. 
The Failures of US Domestic Policies 
To many in Japan, the constant rise in violent crime rates, the drug 
epidemic, a deteriorating infrastructure, increasing illiteracy, and racial 
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tensions in the US are incontrovertible signs of a government unable to 
solve its own problems and of a nation in decline: 
Instead of creating a strong base for growth and wealth through in-
creased R&D spending15, capital expenditures, and employee training, 
the limitless greed of US managers16 and financial institutions to make 
money through acquisitions, mergers, and the juggling of financial 
assets throughout the 1970's and 80's has hastened America's decline. 
The US government's antipathy towards industrial targeting, and 
policies that are at best ambivalent towards industry, play a large role 
in the decline of US competitiveness. Actions that will reduce the 
federal deficit, increase personal savings, reduce capital costs to in-
dustry, ease restrictions on exports, provide incentives for increased 
corporate investment in equipment and employee training, and longer 
time horizons for managers have been needed for many years. But US 
politicians held captive by the various labor, industry and consumer in-
fluence groups have been unable to act. The US has also failed to 
upgrade science, mathematics, and foreign language education. 
The US current trade problems are independent of any conditions in 
Japan. They are the result of actions or lack of actions taken by US 
government and industry. Any changes to the few remaining struc-
tural impediments in Japan would be useless, since the trade imbalance 
cannot be solved without major changes in the US. Therefore, it is up 
to the US to correct its own faults, and begin to produce goods that 
can compete in the Japanese market. 
Many Japanese economists and industrialists believe that many com-
panies in the US industrial sector are simply too small to compete in 
the international arena. These companies lack the capital reserves to 
absorb even short term losses or to make the capital investments 
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necessary to create economies of scale that lead to competitive produc-
tion costs. Although small US companies have been renowned for 
their inventiveness, it is nearly impossible for them to compete with a 
Japanese keiretsu on the scale required in today's internationally com-
petitive world. 
The US Market: Free and Open? 
The US contention that it has the most open market in the world is 
generally greeted in Japan with disbelief. To US trade partners, and 
especially to the Japanese, the US market is open only until foreign 
competition cause problems. A significant portion of Japanese exports 
to the US are limited either by 'voluntary' export restraints demanded 
of and agreed to by the Japanese, or by still existing US import 
duties. Japanese goods have often been the target of efforts to reduce 
imports into the US. The US escape clause provision, antidumping 
statutes, the threat of antitrust actions, and the constant intimidation of 
action under the Super 301 provision of the 1988 US trade bill are ma-
jor barriers to the Japanese ability to compete in the US. 
The inconsistant and seemingly whimsical use of these statutes and 
provisions are also barriers to trade. Japanese, who have little ex-
perience with their own legal system much less that of the US, can 
find just the threat of legal action intimidating, and the extensive cost 
of legal proceedings in time and money is well known. 
Just the initiation of the antidumping clause is in itself a barrier to 
trade. Even if the accusation is found to be groundless, upon a 
preliminary finding of dumping, the accused company must post bonds 
or cash that will cover potential duties that may be retroactively assess-
ed in the future. 
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Other actions taken by the US government are not those of a country 
that says it is the foremost defender of a free market system. For ex-
ample; although in 1981 the Japanese computer manufacturer Fujitsu 
was the low bidder on a contract to link major cities in the northeast 
US with fiber optic telephone service, Congress pressured AT &T to re-
ject the bid for reasons of national security and the contract was finally 
awarded to the lowest domestic bidder; in 1987, then Commerce 
Secretary Malcolm Baldrige and the Defense Department caused 
enough outcry in the press and the public that Fujitsu withdrew its of-
fer to buy the financially troubled Fairchild Semiconductor Company, 
even though the offer was solicited by Fairchild which was then owned 
by the French company Schlumberger17• 
At times the Japanese are caught in a Catch-22 such as in the follow-
ing case between the US Department of Trade and the Justice Depart-
ment. US semiconductor manufactures of random access memory 
chips (RAMS), in 1982, accused the Japanese of selling at excessively 
low prices in order to become dominant in the world market for 64k 
RAMS. Simultaneously, defense officials in the US, citing national 
security, were worried about dependence on Japanese producers for an 
important computer memory device. As a result of earlier price cut-
ting, an unexpected surge in demand from Japanese makers of 
data-processing equipment and US computer manufacturers created a 
shortage of supply which caused prices to suddenly rise and exports to 
the US decrease. As US trade officials assumed the Japanese pro-
ducers were deliberately limiting the exports of these 64k chips to the 
US in order to quiet industry fears of unfair or excessive competition, 
the Justice Department announced that it was investigating Japanese 
semiconductor producers to determine whether the Japanese had con-
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spired to fix prices or supply restrictions on 64k RAMS exported to 
the US. This was at the same time the US was worried about 
predatory pricing. Although market forces were responsible for these 
developing conditions, the Justice Department was not convinced. The 
investigation by the Justice Department was eventually closed in 1984 
due to lack of evidence that price fixing or export restrictions had been 
enacted by Japanese manufacturers. 
Take the case where, in the same breath, US trade negotiators com-
plain of Japan's supposed "managed trade" practices headed by MITI 
and then ask for "voluntary export restraints" on everything from com-
puters and semiconductors to automobiles. Cartel-like agreements 
then become necessary as Japanese exporters must divide market share 
among themselves for products covered by export restraints. This in 
effect makes the US the proponent of Japanese industrial policy18. 
A Changing Domestic Economy 
The gradual, but continuing, reductions in Japan's multilateral trade 
surpluses are the results of market opening strategies at home, in-
vestments abroad, and normalization of the yen exchange rate. Recent 
and proposed changes to the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law and 
distribution system19, stronger enforcement of antimonopoly laws2o, and 
the current agreement between US and Japanese auto makers to in-
crease auto parts imports, are but a few of the steps being taken in 
Japan to stimulate consumption and encourage foreign investment. 
Add to this the growing popularity of catalogue shopping and franchis-
ed retail outlets, the increasing sales in Japan by US controlled com-
panies such as IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Toys "R" Us, SmithKline 
Beecham, Warner-Lambent, and General Mills, and the bilateral trade 
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surpluses will continue to decline. 
Japan View: Summary 
In short, Japan has made more consistent, intelligent use of it's 
limited natural resources and highly trained work force than its 
American counterparts. Japan has made concessions in trade, opened 
its markets, and offered advice, and technical and financial help to its 
ailing allay. In return, instead of using its time and resources to im-
prove its competitive position, the US has taken to criticisms and 
threats of trade retaliation in an effort to reduce the widening trade 
deficit, and resorted to unflattering cultural and racial characterizations 
of the Japanese people. 
It has become nearly impossible for the Japanese to hide their grow-
ing disdain for the US's inability to halt the decline of its society and 
economy. The multitude of social ills that affect the US makes it im-
potent against cultures that still value work and family values above 
self-gratification. The long standing feeling of partnership and obliga-
tion the Japanese have felt towards the US have begun to be replaced 
by contempt. 
America's View: Closed Market/Closed Society 
The US view of the continuing trade problem is very different form 
that of Japan. Japan's expanding export surpluses and the current 
world-wide recession, combined with the continued difficulty the US, 
as well as European and Asian countries have in penetrating the 
Japanese market justifies an aggressive reaction to Japan's trade prac-
tices. It is widely believed that US goods cannot enter the Japanese 
market nearly as easily as Japanese goods enter the US market. The 
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current "buy American" drive in the US and recent calls in congress 
for establishing quotas and tariffs on imported and even domestically 
produced Japanese goods reflect the growing impatience and frustra-
tions with Japan. 
Although Japan has achieved economic power equivalent to that of 
its western allies, and has recently been seeking more influence with 
the United Nations, and in the policy making of it's southeast Asian 
neighbors, it has shown no interest in assuming the risks that accom-
pany global responsibilities. To some Americans, not limited to the so 
called "revisionists", the Japanese are a mercantilist society lacking 
any exportable philosophy, whose only goal is the pursuit of global 
dominance in trade and exports21 . "All of Japan's interactions with 
the rest of the world in trade, investment, aid, and defense can be inter-
preted as those of a country acting purely in self-interest, and with 
regard only to consequences for itself. Japan seems to change its inter-
national policies only in response to threats, and thus appears to the 
rest of the world to act in a defensive and ungenerous manner22." 
This is very different from the US experience, when in the 1940's it 
abandoned its isolationist foreign policies and used its great material 
and human resources in favor of global responsibility and assumed un-
precedented financial burdens in rebuilding the devastated post-war 
world. The Japanese see their responsibility limited to their own coun-
try, which is reflected in protectionist trade policies. 
Japan's barriers to imports and investment could be placed into three 
broad categories: formal barriers to imports and investment, indirect 
but very effective informal barriers consisting of traditional business 
relationships and practices that exclude foreigners, and finally, at-
titudinal barriers that make foreign companies the last resort for im-
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ports and investment capital. Though Japan is constantly citing im-
proved balance in its trade statistics and tariff reductions, these three 
types of barriers are so effective that the market share of foreigners in 
technologically advanced areas remain at low rates and often become in-
significant when Japanese made equivalent goods come on the market. 
Formal Barriers 
For the most part, formal barriers to importing and investment in 
Japan are similar to those of other countries. These barriers protect 
agricultural and industrial sectors that are considered to be important 
for national security or are politically sensitive. The difference is that 
the sectors Japan considers to be of national importance go far beyond 
those of its trading partners. 
In 1989, after tariff negotiations with the US, Japan eliminated 
tariffs on 1,004 manufactured products. Its tariff rates on industrial 
products now average just 2%, while tariffs on agricultural products 
are 12.1%. These tariff and quota reductions have done little to im-
prove the foreign competitive position in Japan because they have in-
variably come after, not before, Japanese producers became interna-
tionally competitive. These reductions have mainly been a public rela-
tions effort by the Japanese government to calm US anger over lack of 
market access. So many formal trade barriers still remain that Japan 
consistently has the most pages devoted to it in the Office of the US 
Trade Representative's annual survey of foreign trade barriers. In 
1991, the trade issues of concern to the US were grouped into seven 
major sectors: import policies; standards, testing, labeling and certifica-
tion; government procurement; lack of intellectual property protec-
tion; services barriers; investment barriers; and other barriers23. 
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The differences in patent protection are a major hindrance to invest-
ment by foreign companies in Japan. "The goal of Western 'patent' 
systems is to protect and reward individual entrepreneurs and in-
novative businesses, to encourage invention and the advancement of 
practical knowledge. The intent of the Japanese system is to share 
technology, not to protect it24." A patent application in Japan, which 
requires precise technical data, is open to the public. Any competitor 
may inspect, copy, and even produce goods that may be based on data 
in the patent application before it is granted, thus inhibiting foreign 
companies from even contemplating filing. Japanese companies also 
regularly apply a tactic referred to as "patent flooding": the filing of 
numerous unworthy patents that surround the core technology of 
another inventor. The purpose of this is to make the original ap-
plicants' defense of the patent so costly in time, money and manpower, 
that the Japanese company can gain virtually free access to the 
technology by extracting cross-licensing agreements. 
Barriers to foreign capital investment are equally formidable. In-
vesting in the Japanese stock market often requires actions such as 
kickbacks, bribes and refunds on lost investments that are unavailable 
to foreign investors, and can be both illegal and unethical in foreign 
markets25. The Japanese government also continues to regulate 
foreign investment in the following sectors: aircraft, space develop-
ment, agriculture, fishing and forestry, oil and gas, mining, leather and 
leather product manufacturing, and tobacco manufacturing. Table 1 
shows just a few of the firms where foreign ownership is restricted26. 
Indirect Barriers 
The second barrier to foreign participation consists of historical 
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Table 1 
Maximum % of 
foreign ownership allowed. 
Arabian Oil 25 
NTT 0 
KDD 0 
Mainichi Broadcasting 20 
Arabian Oil 25 
Nippon Air Systems 33.3 
General Oil 49 
Showa Shell 50 
Hitachi 25 
business and social practices and interactions. These barriers include 
the costly and inefficient distribution system, long standing business 
relationships among industrial groupings that inhibit purchasing 
cheaper goods from new domestic or foreign suppliers, the pursuit of 
market share over profit, trading companies more intent on exporting 
than importing goods that compete with domestic production, and legal 
cartels27, to mention just a few. These informal barriers make it very 
difficult for domestic companies to enter a new market, and nearly im-
possible for foreign companies to do so. 
Japan's many layered distribution system, price supports and 
manufacturer rebates increase the costs of imported and domestically 
produced goods to the point where it becomes difficult to compete on 
price. Japan's unique price structure creates a situation whereby even 
Japanese made goods often cost less in the US and other foreign 
markets than at home. In December of 1991, the author purchased a 
Japanese-made laptop computer in the US for 20% less than it would 
have cost in Hiroshima two weeks earlier. Japanese prices for most 
consumer products are the highest among the industrial countries. 
Many surveys have confirmed what everyone knows who has shopped 
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in Japan: prices are usually 50 to 500 percent more expensive than 
they are in the US. This makes it very difficult for imported goods to 
compete on the basis of price. For example, the price of a US made 
computer printer bought in the US and shipped air freight to Japan in-
cluding US sales tax of 8%, Japanese sales tax of 3%, import tax of 
3.7%, and air freight costs would still be about 20% less, or $150, than 
if bought in Japan through the normal distribution system. 
Japan's industrial groupings, or keiretsu, and their almost feudalistic 
control of suppliers, create a major barrier to foreign entry into the 
Japanese market. The practice of mutual share holding and the ex-
istence of stable shareholders who hold company stock but never trade 
it, at best, limits foreign investment in Japanese companies to joint ven-
tures. These interlocking relationships make it all but impossible for 
one branch of a keiretsu to switch its supplier to a US exporter even if 
the product in question is considerably cheaper and of higher quality. 
The most likely response to a cheaper and higher quality foreign pro-
duct on the market is not to make purchases from a foreign vender, 
but to require its suppliers to squeeze costs and, if necessary, 
employees, in order to meet the foreign competition and produce the 
product domestically. 
Attitude 
The third barrier to entry into the Japanese market is attitudinal. 
The majority of Japanese businessmen and government bureaucrats 
still have a deep seated aversion to importing goods that could other-
wise be made in Japan at anything near the same price or quality. 
This attitude may very well be the result of the Japanese not wanting 
to be dependent on foreigners for goods and thus vulnerable to outside 
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influences. 
This attitude also enables business and the bureaucracy to justify the 
exploitation of the Japanese people through higher- domestic prices and 
subsides to US and other foreign consumers in order to protect 
Japanese manufacturers. Higher profit margins in the Japanese home 
markets enable Japanese corporations to compensate for lower export 
prices, allowing them to gain a potentially devastating foreign market 
share and to protect themselves from the price competitive export 
drive of the newly industrialized economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Korea and Taiwan. The failure of yen appreciation to have the ex-
pected effect of raising export prices and lowering domestic consumer 
prices on imported goods illustrates this propensity to exploit the 
Japanese consumer in favor of industry28. 
It must be said that these attitudinal barriers exist mainly on the 
government and corporate level. Given the choice, the average con-
sumer will buy cheaper, high quality foreign goods. If this were not 
true there would be no need for the many barriers to foreign competi-
tion. 
The Case of Computers 
To illustrate how these formal, informal, and attitudinal barriers 
work to restrict foreign imports and investments we can examine some 
of the case history of the computer and supercomputer industry in 
Japan29. There is not enough space to review all the points in detail 
but the major impediments to US competition in Japan will be review-
ed. The same case could be made for the electronics, automobile, 
steel and semiconductor industries in Japan. 
In 1957 the Japanese government passed the Extraordinary Measures 
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Law for Promotion of the Electronics Industry. This law and others 
allowed subsidies and tax benefits to the industry as well as exempting 
the industry from antitrust law, and encouraged companies in the in-
dustry to cooperate on price, production, investment and R&D. In the 
late 1950's IBM, which had been present in Japan since 1925 and had 
long wanted to set up a subsidiary in Japan but had been prohibited by 
the Japanese government, started to complain about Japanese infringe-
ment on IBM patents. MITI, realizing that access to IBM technology 
was necessary for the future success of the domestic computer in-
dustry, finally allowed IBM to set up a wholly owned subsidiary in ex-
change for license agreements on its patents. MITI required IBM to 
negotiate with it instead of individual companies and thus won licenses' 
agreements at much lower rates than if IBM had been allowed to 
negotiate with each company. MITI also controlled the quantity and 
models of computers that IBM could produce and sell in Japan as well 
as which specific parts IBM could import for production. MITI also 
decided how much IBM was required to export, and limited the 
amount of profit Japan-IBM could repatriate to its parent company. 
All of these limitations had the desired effect of keeping IBM on the 
defensive until domestic companies gained competitive experience and 
strength. 
IBM was able to avoid being forced onto making a joint venture 
under the Foreign Investment Law of 1950, but others were not so for-
tunate. US firms that wanted subsidiaries in Japan were held at bay 
for years, and when finally allowed to enter the market they were forc-
ed to make joint ventures rather than wholly owned subsidiaries, and 
were obliged to transfer technologies as part of the deal. Sperry Rand 
was required to take on a Japanese partner who had majority owner-
100 
ship in the late 1950's when it wanted to sell computers in Japan, and 
again in the early 1960's when it warned to start production in 
Japan. Hewlett Packard was allowed into Japan only after it was forc-
ed to take on a Japanese joint partner who again controlled 51% of the 
shares. 
The example of Texas Instruments (TI) shows how government-in-
dustry collusion took advantage of those companies less powerful than 
IBM. TI applied for 14 patents in Japan in 1960 and asked for permis-
sion to establish a wholly owned subsidiary in 1964. By refusing to 
act on either application the government allowed Japanese companies 
to copy all of TI's technology for years without paying for it. TI won 
approval for some patents in 1977 and combined others into one ap-
plication. TI was finally approved a patent in October 1989, twenty 
nine years after the original application (the US patent process takes, 
on average, 18 months). TI was finally allowed to establish a sub-
sidiary in Japan, but was forced to enter into a 50-50 joint venture 
with a relatively small, inexperienced partner. 
The recent development of the supercomputer industry is another ex-
ample of the difficulties US company's have had in penetrating the 
Japanese market. There are four major supercomputer companies in 
the world: Cray Research of the US, and Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC of 
Japan. 
In 1980 Crayand CDC/ETA (a US supercomputer company that has 
since withdrawn from the industry) controlled the world market for 
supercomputers with a 90% and 10% market share respectively. By 
1986, with NEC, Hitachi and Fujitsu now in the market and after 
CDC/ETA had dropped out, Cray's world market share fell to 60.7%, 
and then to 53.1% in 1989. This fall in market share is a reasonable 
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development given the extremely high cost and rapid advancement in 
the supercomputer industry, and as a reaction to competitive forces. 
What is not a reasonable result of competition within the industry is 
that Cray's 1989 world market share of 53.1%, and European share of 
83% differs markedly from the 10.1% share it had in Japan. 
Something other than market forces is at work here. Since the three 
Japanese supercomputer companies are members of industrial groups, 
it is very difficult for those within the group to purchase competitors' 
products even though they may be superior. 
The Japanese governments purchasing statistics lean even more 
heavily towards the domestic market. In 1984 and 1989, 90% of com-
puters used by the Japanese government were Japanese made while on-
ly 59% of the private sector used domestic machines. When the 
Japanese government started buying supercomputers in 1983, there 
was no public notification of procurement, and the Japanese producers 
gave discounts of up to 80 or 90%. By 1986 the Japanese government 
had purchased 22 supercomputers only 1 of which was foreign made 
even though it was acknowledged in the industry that, at that time, US 
computers were far superior in speed, function and availability of soft-
ware. 
In October of 1987 MITI had two public institutions purchase one 
supercomputer each from Cray and CDC/ETA. Although the bidding 
was open there was no chance for Japanese companies to win. With 
these two purchases the Japanese government was trying to alleviate 
trade friction in the computer industry and thought that it had fulfilled 
its promise to buy supercomputers which was negotiated in 1987. The 
US side saw it as two token purchases instead of a free and open 
market. The final 1990 agreement required Japan to give full public 
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notice of their intentions to purchase supercomputers. Bids were open 
in the future, but because of the heavy discounts offered by Japanese 
companies the US companies could not compete on their superior per-
formance. 
All Encompassing Impediments 
The legal and structural barriers to US entry is not limited to the 
high-tech industries. Until 1983, foreign entrants to the phar-
maceutical industry were required to have the support of a Japanese 
firm to receive the necessary permit to manufacture or import drugs, 
which in effect made it necessary for foreign firms to license their 
technologies and establish sales agreements with established Japanese 
firms. Also, all clinical testing had to be conducted in Japan on 
Japanese citizens (on the grounds that Japanese are racially different), 
requiring costly test duplication and time delays3o. Japanese 
distributors or wholesalers interested in adding imports to their sales 
lines or discounting prices to below the manufactures suggested retail 
price, are often threatened with a shutoff of supply or with demands 
by Japanese manufacturers and distributors for immediate payment31 • 
Global Trade Imbalance 
US complaints of restricted access to Japanese markets are 
remarkably similar to those of European countries and the developing 
countries in Asia. How is it that the US, Europe and Asia are wrong 
and Japan is right? 
When rejecting US accusations of unfair trade practices, Japan often 
cites US internal problems and lack of 'hard work' as the main reasons 
for the US's inability to penetrate the Japanese market. It's 1991 
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record world trade surplus of $72.23 billion indicates that Japan 
doesn't have a US-Japan trade problem, but a Japan-world trade pro-
blem. The 1991 trade surpluses with the US, EC and Asian countries 
rose 1.3%, 48.1%, and 43.2% respectively32. Japan's closest neighbor, 
Korea, has long standing and continuing complaints about trade im-
balances and barriers, especially in the transfer of technology33. 
Despite citing statistics that purport to show an evening out of imports 
of manufactured goods, Japan's ratio of imports to gross domestic pro-
duct has, alone among major industrial countries, declined since 195634• It 
is obvious that it is Japan who is out of step with international trade 
practices, not the opposite. 
Japanese officials again and again point to the same handful of suc-
cessful subsidiaries of foreign companies that have managed to carve 
out a respectable share of the Japanese market. But sales by foreign 
subsidiaries in Japan are not the same as an open door to manufac-
tured imports. 
Japan's Foreign Investment: New Colonialism? 
Japanese officials often note the increasing number of yen laden 
tourists headed for the US, and rising investment in the US industrial 
and financial sectors as two factors that offset the trade imbalance. It 
is true that some capital may be entering the economy through increas-
ed service industry employment, but these types of jobs do not build 
the high-tech and industrial base needed to be competitive in the inter-
national market. Making beds and flipping hamburgers is no 
substitute for building an industrial base in preparation for the next 
generation of advanced technology. Japanese companies that invest in 
the US in order to circumvent import barriers, that are promised tax 
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breaks, union free shops, and other favorable investment opportunities, 
are doing little to support the US economy or increase employment if 
their new state-of-the-art factories rely largely on imported Japanese 
made parts and transplanted suppliers, and force existing American 
plants to close35. The recent surge in Japanese direct investment may 
prove even more detrimental to surviving US industries than Japanese 
exports. 
Racism 
Japanese accusations that racism plays a role in US demands and 
dissatisfaction in trade disputes is the pot calling the kettle black. The 
familiar and increasing complaints and law suits by American 
employees in Japanese corporations in the US that there is a 'glass ceil-
ing' to promotions that only Japanese Nationals can rise above36 ; the 
fact that Japanese corporations seeking to build in the US obtain detail-
ed racial demographic data and then locate their plants in areas with 
fewer minorities37 ; the restrictive and discriminatory employment 
policies in Japan itself38; and the constant string of racially derogatory 
statements made by Japanese politicians show where the racial biases 
really lie. South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have 
some of the same difficulties in exporting to Japan as the US. Surely 
their complaints of Japan's import practices cannot be dismissed as 
racism, lack of hard work, or inability to understand the Japanese 
business mentality. 
US View: Summary 
Despite yen revaluation, numerous import liberalization programs, 
and the hard work of knowledgeable and dedicated US businesses, 
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market access for many US made goods has improved only slightly. 
The excessive export zeal Japan exhibits, and the ability of Japanese 
companies to forgo profit in their quest of ever increasing market share 
has resulted in the failure of key US domestic industries. It matters 
little whether or not Japan intentionally set out to destroy the US 
economically, the results are the same. 
Given the combination of cultural factors, industrial policies, aversion 
to importing, unprecedented export zeal, and the continuing exploita-
tion of US markets by Japanese businesses without regard to the long 
term consequences, bitter and emotional criticism must be expected. 
Although some complaints may be the result of biases, the evidence 
that Japan's business practices and trade objectives are different from 
the rest of the international community are undeniable. Until Japan br-
ings its policies more into line with its trading partners, it must be 
prepared to be the object of criticism. 
Concluding Remarks 
Some extremists on both sides of the Pacific will accept the above 
arguments in their entirety, but for most of us the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle. Differing perceptions will continue to evoke 
nationalism in both countries. This is a natural reaction in democratic 
societies when external economic forces seem to present a threat to 
ones independence. 
But it has become clear that economic and political policies of na-
tions have become so interdependent that a nation's domestic policies 
directly effect other countries, and therefore are of legitimate concern 
to a much greater extent than in the past. Future trade issues will go 
beyond tariff and sector-specific issues to a discussion of general ad-
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ministrative and structural barriers and to a more open trade and in-
vestment system. Inevitably this will reach into highly sensitive areas, 
raising the charge of interference in a country's internal affairs. That 
is the price to be paid for interdependence because the past pattern of 
patron-client relations is changing toward one of multi-lateral partner-
ships, with greater flexibility and independence on the part of all par-
ties. 
Problems of perception will continue to be a factor in international 
relations especially as the economies of individual countries merge into 
an international economy. The inevitability of the one-economy world 
requires us to search for increased understanding and tolerance of op-
posing views. 
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